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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Daniel Castro, a high-ranking official in the 
Philadelphia Police Department, was indicted in connection 
with three separate schemes to extort money from separate 
individuals by use of violence.  He was convicted by a jury on 
one count of making a material false statement to federal 
agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and acquitted on one 
count of conspiracy to commit extortion in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 894.  The jury hung on the remaining eight counts. 
 
To avoid a retrial, Castro pled guilty to a count of 
conspiracy to commit extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951.  In exchange the government agreed to dismiss the 
remaining charges against him.  Castro‟s plea agreement 
contained an appellate waiver provision under which, subject 
to some exceptions, he “voluntarily and expressly waive[d] 
all rights to appeal or collaterally attack” his “conviction, 
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sentence, or any other matter relating to this prosecution.”  
(App. at 127.)  The District Court sentenced him to 
concurrent sentences of 18 months in prison for his 
conviction for false statements and 60 months in prison for 
his conviction by guilty plea for conspiracy to commit 
extortion.  
 
In this appeal, Castro challenges three facets of his 
conviction and sentence.  First, he contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of making a false 
statement to the FBI about money allegedly received from an 
extortion victim.  He argues that, because the money in 
question came from the FBI in the course of a sting operation, 
he told the literal truth when he denied having received any 
money from the alleged victim.  Second, Castro challenges 
the District Court‟s authority to deny the government‟s 
motion, made pursuant to § 3E1.1(b) of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, for a one level decrease in his offense 
level calculated under the guidelines.  Third, Castro maintains 
that, in arriving at a sentence that was 19 months higher than 
the top of the range recommended by the guidelines, the 
District Court failed to adequately account for his record of 
good works.  The government responds that Castro‟s first two 
arguments are barred by his appellate waiver and that, as to 
the third argument, Castro cannot show that the sentence is 
unreasonable. 
 
We conclude that the appellate waiver encompasses 
both Castro‟s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and 
his claim that the District Court lacked authority to deny the 
government‟s motion for a one level decrease in his offense 
level.  However, while the waiver properly applies to prevent 
our considering the District Court‟s refusal to award the 
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requested downward departure, we conclude that application 
of the waiver against the sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
argument would, in the unusual circumstances of this case, 
work a miscarriage of justice.  We will therefore vacate 
Castro‟s conviction and 18-month sentence for making a false 
statement to federal agents.  We will also vacate Castro‟s 60-
month sentence because the invalid conviction for false 
statements was included in calculating Castro‟s overall 
offense level, causing that level to be higher than it otherwise 
would have been and resulting in a sentencing range that is no 
longer applicable.  We are accordingly not in a position to 
evaluate Castro‟s reasonableness challenge, and we will 
remand the case to the District Court for resentencing solely 
on the conviction for conspiracy to commit extortion. 
 
I. Background 
 
 A. Facts 
 
Castro rose from challenging circumstances to become 
one of the highest ranking officers in the Philadelphia Police 
Department.  During his 25 years of service as a policeman, 
he received numerous accolades and advancements, only a 
handful of which we mention here.  In 1997, he was promoted 
to Captain.  In 2001, he was nominated by the then-Mayor of 
Philadelphia, Edward Rendell, and Police Commissioner John 
Timoney to represent the Philadelphia Police Department as 
an Eisenhower Fellow, an important position that placed 
Castro in contact with community leaders from business, 
academia, and political and non-profit organizations, and 
allowed him to be part of international leadership mentoring 
programs.  And in 2010, he was promoted to the position of 
Inspector, a high-ranking position within the police force.  By 
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all accounts, Castro was well regarded within the Philadelphia 
Police Department, and, as noted below, he saw himself as a 
viable candidate to one day become police commissioner.  
His successes and substantial authority make his subsequent 
criminal behavior all the more disturbing and damning. 
 
In 2006, Castro invested $90,000 in a residential real 
estate development project organized by an acquaintance 
named Wilson Encarnacion.  When the project failed, Castro 
repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought repayment from 
Encarnacion.  The lost investment represented Castro‟s life 
savings.   
 
In 2010, Castro discussed with another acquaintance, 
Rony Moshe, his frustration over the personally disastrous 
investment.  Moshe mentioned that he knew a couple of tough 
debt collectors, and Castro asked if Moshe could engage the 
collectors to pressure Encarnacion to repay Castro‟s losses – 
losses that Castro evidently thought of as a debt Encarnacion 
owed him.  Unbeknownst to Castro, Moshe was an FBI 
informant.  He reported his conversation with Castro to the 
FBI, and an investigation was launched.  At the FBI‟s behest, 
Moshe began secretly recording telephone conversations and 
in-person meetings with Castro.  The undercover operation 
ran from April through November of 2010. 
 
On April 7, 2010, Moshe told Castro in a series of 
recorded telephone calls that he had found a “collector” for 
Castro who was willing to collect the $90,000 debt from 
Encarnacion.  Although Castro‟s loss on the failed investment 
was $90,000, he instructed Moshe to have the collector 
demand $150,000.  When Moshe told Castro that the collector 
would use threatening and intimidating collection methods, 
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Castro responded that he did not want to know the specific 
methods, that he did not want to meet the collector, and that 
he did not want the collector to know Castro‟s identity.  
Castro emphasized that he did not want to get “implicated 
into this.”  (App. at 1291.)  But he went ahead and provided 
Moshe with Encarnacion‟s home address, and he told Moshe 
to send the collector there because Encarnacion‟s wife and 
child would be there and “they‟ll get scared.”  (App. at 346.) 
 
Later, on June 4, Castro spoke by telephone with an 
undercover FBI agent posing as the collector.  In that 
conversation, which was recorded, the agent told Castro that 
he and an associate had obtained $5,000 from Encarnacion 
and had $4,500 to give to Castro, with $500 being withheld as 
a collection fee.  The agent represented that Encarnacion had 
initially denied owing Castro any money but relented after the 
agent and his associate went inside Encarnacion‟s house and 
the agent threatened Encarnacion by telling him that he would 
“f--- his wife” if he refused to pay.  (App. at 1321-23.) 
 
On June 11, Castro met with Moshe, who gave Castro 
the $4,500 supposedly collected from Encarnacion.  Moshe 
said that, following Encarnacion‟s encounter with the 
collector, Encarnacion was “scared to death.”  (App. at 3691.)  
Castro replied, “Good, Good, Good.”  (App. at 361.)  Castro 
acknowledged that the collector “mean[t] serious business,” 
and he mentioned that he was concerned that Encarnacion 
might go to the police.  (App. at 1332-33, 360-62.) 
 
Castro met with Moshe again on July 20, 2010, and 
Moshe gave him another $2,100 that the collector had 
supposedly obtained from Encarnacion.  That money, like the 
first payment, came from the FBI.  There is no evidence that 
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Encarnacion was aware of the FBI‟s payments to Castro or 
that the FBI‟s payments somehow reduced a debt actually 
owed by Encarnacion. Moshe stated that if Castro wanted to 
recover his money more quickly, the collector would have to 
become “more aggressive.”  (App. at 377.)  Castro was 
hesitant to authorize more aggressive tactics, telling Moshe, 
“I can‟t get myself in trouble. …  I want to be Police 
Commissioner.”  (App. at 564.)  Nevertheless, Castro urged 
Moshe to have the collector go back to Encarnacion‟s home 
and collect more money – “$10,000 at a shot.”  (App at 384.) 
 
Around that time, the undercover operation paused for 
nearly two months because Moshe suffered a stroke.  In early 
September 2010, Moshe and Castro resumed speaking and, 
on September 10, Moshe told Castro that Encarnacion was 
refusing to pay.  Moshe asked Castro if he wanted the 
collector to “rough him up.”  (App. at 1369-70.)  Castro 
responded, “Well, get, get my money.  I want, I want my 
money.  They, they, they, they know how to get it.”  (App. at 
1371.)  When Moshe said that the collector might “break[] a 
leg, a hand, you know,” Castro responded, “I don‟t, I don‟t 
want the guy dead.  I don‟t, I don‟t want to kill him.”  (App. 
at 1373-76.) 
 
During that conversation Castro broached the topic of 
a second debt collection effort.  Castro told Moshe of two 
acquaintances, business partners Billy Wong and Alan Kats, 
who were looking to hire a debt collector.  Moshe noted that, 
to extract money, the collectors would have to get rough with 
Wong‟s and Kats‟s debtor. Castro asked Moshe to meet with 
Wong on September 15, 2010.  Castro admitted in his 
testimony at trial that he understood, as of that date but not 
before, that the supposed collectors would batter Wong‟s and 
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Kats‟s debtor.  He also acknowledged that he became aware 
at that time that the collectors Moshe had engaged for him 
would use threats of violence and, if necessary, actual 
violence to get money from Encarnacion.  (District Court 
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 90:228-29 (Tr. 4/14/11) (Castro: “On 
[September 10], I crossed the line … .  Q: [Wong and Kats‟ 
debtor is] gonna get beaten, right?  Just like [Encarnacion] – 
gonna get beaten, isn‟t that right?  A: You can safely 
inference that, yes, sir.”)). 
 
On September 15, 2010, Moshe met with Wong and 
Kats, who explained that they needed help collecting $26,000 
that had been lost in a failed nightclub investment.  Moshe 
told them about the collector whom he had used for Castro, 
and Kats told Moshe to go ahead and engage the collector‟s 
services.  Wong and Kats understood that compelling their 
“debtor” to pay would involve threats of violence and, 
perhaps, actual violence.  On September 22, Wong and Kats 
met with an undercover FBI agent posing as the collector, and 
Kats authorized the agent to use violence to collect the 
money.  Later, on October 1, 2010, the undercover agent gave 
Kats $3,000 supposedly collected from the debtor, and 
approximately a month after that, the agent similarly gave 
Kats an additional $5,000.   
 
On September 21, 2010, Moshe again spoke to Castro 
about the effort to collect money from Encarnacion.  He said 
that the collectors had recovered a “pretty big chunk” of 
money by getting “pretty rough” with Encarnacion.  (App. at 
400-01.)  Castro replied, “They got the end result.”  (App. at 
401.)  About one week later, Moshe gave Castro $14,000 out 
of $15,000 that had supposedly been collected from 
Encarnacion, plus a $500 “referral fee” for referring Wong 
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and Kats to the “collectors.”  (D.I. 91:87-88 (Tr. 4/15); D.I. 
137:22 (Plea).)  During that meeting, Castro also told Moshe 
of a third collection job to refer to the collectors, this time for 
$1.5 million in Florida.   
 
Soon thereafter, on October 4, 2010, FBI agent Brian 
Nichilo and Detective Steve Snyder of the Philadelphia Police 
conducted an unrecorded interview with Castro in which they 
pretended to be investigating a complaint from Encarnacion 
that he was being threatened in relation to a debt he owed.  
According to Nichilo‟s testimony at trial, Castro claimed that 
he had not discussed with anyone the collection of a debt 
from Encarnacion,
1
 that he did not hire anyone to extort 
money from Encarnacion,
2
 and that he had not received any 
money from Encarnacion.  Specifically, Nichilo testified that 
he asked Castro “whether he had ever collected any money 
from Mr. Encarnacion since he originally gave him the 
$90,000 in 2006.”  (App. at 105-06.)  Castro responded, 
according to Nichilo, that he had not collected any money 
from Encarnacion.  (App. at 106.)  In his own trial testimony 
                                              
1
 Count Four, on which the jury hung, charged Castro 
with making a false statement to the FBI in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1001 when he “told FBI agents that, outside of [a 
civil] lawsuit [against Encarnacion] and general complaining 
to friends,” he had “not had any discussions with anyone 
about how he could collect from [Encarnacion].”  (App. at 
40.) 
2
 Count Five, another count on which the jury hung, 
charged Castro with making a false statement to the FBI by 
stating that “he did not hire anyone to threaten or hurt 
[Encarnacion] to collect the debt.”  (App. at 41.) 
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regarding that interview with law enforcement officials, 
Castro admitted  that he had “lied” when he “told them I 
didn‟t know anything about what they asked me,” (App. at 
121), and that he did not “tell them the truth.”  (App. at 906.)  
But Castro denied making the particular statements recounted 
by Nichilo.   
 
On October 12, 2010, Castro described his meeting 
with the FBI to Moshe.  Castro instructed Moshe to cease 
collecting money from Encarnacion “for right now” (App. at 
407), but he asked Moshe to have the collectors go to Florida 
to commence a collection effort there.   
 
Castro was arrested on November 5, 2010.  FBI agents 
searched his home and recovered the money that he had 
received from Moshe and that he had been told came from 
Encarnacion.   
 
 B. Course of Proceedings 
 
A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania returned a ten-count superseding indictment on 
February 3, 2011, against Castro.  Only two counts are of 
importance to this appeal.  Count Three charged that on 
October 4, 2010, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, Castro 
made a false statement to federal law enforcement officers in 
connection with his efforts to collect money from 
Encarnacion – specifically, “that he had not received any 
payments from [Encarnacion] towards the debt [Encarnacion] 
supposedly owed” him.  (App. at 39.)  Count Nine charged 
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Castro with conspiring with Wong and Kats to commit 
extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
3
   
 
A jury convicted Castro on Count Three, acquitted him 
on Count Ten, which charged the use of extortionate means to 
collect a debt, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894, and returned a 
hung verdict on the remaining eight counts.  To avoid a 
scheduled retrial, Castro entered into a plea agreement with 
the government, pursuant to which he pled guilty to Count 
Nine.  The agreement included a broad waiver of his appellate 
rights.   
 
At sentencing, the parties agreed that the combination 
of convictions on Counts Three and Nine led, under the 
applicable sentencing guidelines, to a sentencing range of 30 
to 37 months, based on an offense level of 19 and criminal 
history category of I.  The government also agreed to file a 
motion seeking a three-level downward departure under 
§ 3E1.1(b) of the guidelines.  Pursuant to that provision of the 
guidelines, the typical two-level reduction of a defendant‟s 
offense level gained by accepting responsibility can become a 
three-level reduction if the government files a motion stating 
that “the defendant has assisted authorities in the 
investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely 
notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, 
thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial 
                                              
3
 Wong, who was also charged in Counts Nine and Ten 
of the superseding indictment, pled guilty to those counts and 
agreed to testify against Castro.  Kats was charged in a 
separate indictment for his involvement in the extortion 
scheme, and he pled guilty to attempted collection of credit 
by extortionate means.   
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and permitting the government and the court to allocate their 
resources efficiently[.]”4  When the government made that 
motion in this case, however, the Court sua sponte rejected it, 
making Castro‟s offense level 20 (instead of 19), and 
accordingly making the guidelines range 33 to 41 months 
(instead of 30 to 37 months).  The Court then imposed an 
upward variance to bring the sentence to 60 months in prison 
on Count Nine, concurrent with 18 months on Count Three, 
to be followed by three years of supervised release.  The 
Court also imposed a $10,000 fine and $200 in special 
assessments.   
 
Castro then filed this timely appeal.   
                                              
4
 Section 3E1.1 provides in full: 
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates 
acceptance of responsibility for his offense, 
decrease the offense level by 2 levels. 
(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease 
under subsection (a), the offense level 
determined prior to the operation of subsection 
(a) is level 16 or greater, and upon motion of 
the government stating that the defendant has 
assisted authorities in the investigation or 
prosecution of his own misconduct by timely 
notifying authorities of his intention to enter a 
plea of guilty, thereby permitting the 
government to avoid preparing for trial and 
permitting the government and the court to 
allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the 
offense level by 1 additional level. 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1. 
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II. Discussion
5
 
 
Castro raises three arguments on appeal.  First, he 
contends that his conviction should be vacated because “there 
was a complete failure of proof on Count Three,” which 
charged him with “knowingly making a false statement to the 
FBI” by lying when he denied that he had received any 
money from Encarnacion in repayment of the $90,000 lost 
investment.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 16.)  Castro argues that, in 
fact, he “had not received any such repayments” from 
Encarnacion but had instead received money from the FBI in 
a sting operation.  (Id.)  Thus, he says, his denial “was not 
„false,‟ much less „knowingly‟ so.”  (Id.)  He reasons that 
since his denial was literally true, even if he did not 
appreciate it as such, “the evidence was insufficient to convict 
on Count Three,” and his conviction on that count must “be 
vacated and the case remanded for resentencing on Count 
Nine alone.”  (Id.) 
 
Second, Castro maintains that his sentence was 
procedurally unreasonable because the District Court 
erroneously denied the government‟s motion that his offense 
level be reduced not just two points but three points for 
“acceptance of responsibility” under the sentencing 
guidelines.  He argues that § 3E1.1(b) of the guidelines 
confers upon the government, not the court, “the discretion … 
to allow a third level of reduction,” (id.), and that this 
                                              
5
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, because the indictment alleged 
offenses against the United States.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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discretion is entitled to “full deference.”  United States v. 
Drennon, 516 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
Third, Castro asserts that his 60-month sentence is 
procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the 
guidelines range determined by the District Court suggested a 
period of imprisonment of 33 to 41 months.  He argues that 
the Court did not adequately take into account evidence of his 
good character and failed to explain why such a harsh 
sentence was necessary to fulfill the proper purposes of 
sentencing. 
 
The government responds that Castro‟s first two 
challenges are barred by the appellate waiver contained in his 
plea agreement.  In the alternative, the government argues 
that even if the appellate waiver does not foreclose Castro‟s 
claims, neither issue was raised in the District Court, and 
Castro cannot show that either of those claimed problems 
rises to the level of plain error.  The government concedes 
that Castro‟s third argument is not barred by the appellate 
waiver, but it argues that “Castro cannot show that no 
reasonable court would have imposed such a sentence under 
[the] circumstances” of this case.  (Appellee‟s Br. at 24-25.) 
 
In the sections that follow, we address each of Castro‟s 
three arguments, with the first two arguments being affected 
by his appellate waiver. 
 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Castro’s   
  Conviction for False Statements 
 
Before addressing either of Castro‟s first two 
contentions, we must first determine whether his appellate 
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waiver bars us from even considering them.  As part of his 
plea agreement, Castro generally agreed that he would neither 
appeal nor present any collateral challenge to his conviction 
or sentence.  In pertinent part, the appellate waiver provides 
that, “[i]n exchange for the undertakings made by the 
government in entering this plea agreement, the defendant 
voluntarily and expressly waives all rights to appeal or 
collaterally attack the defendant‟s conviction, sentence, or 
any other matter relating to this prosecution[.]”  (App. at 
127.)  The waiver does, however, contain two exceptions that 
are relevant to this appeal: first, the waiver does not “bar the 
assertion of constitutional claims that the relevant case law 
holds cannot be waived” (App. at 127); and, second, the 
waiver allows appeal for “claims that … the sentencing judge, 
exercising the Court‟s discretion pursuant to United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), imposed an unreasonable 
sentence above the final Sentencing Guideline range 
determined by the Court.”  (App. at 128.) 
 
“We exercise plenary review in deciding whether an 
issue raised by a defendant falls within the scope of an 
appellate waiver in his plea agreement.”  United States v. 
Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 537 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).  When “the 
government invokes an appellate-waiver provision … , we 
must determine as a threshold matter whether … [that] waiver 
prevents us from exercising our jurisdiction to review the 
merits of the defendant‟s appeal.”  United States v. Corso, 
549 F.3d 921, 926 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).  “We 
decline to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal where [1] the 
issues on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver and [2] 
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver, 
unless [3] „enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of 
justice.‟”  United States v. Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237, 242 (3d 
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Cir. 2012) (quoting Corso, 549 F.3d at 927); accord United 
States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc). 
 
Under the first prong, we evaluate the language of the 
appellate waiver to determine if the disputed appeal falls 
within its scope.  We follow the “well-established principle 
that plea agreements, although arising in the criminal context, 
are analyzed under contract law standards.”  Goodson, 544 
F.3d at 535 n.3 (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “[I]n light of those standards, the language of an 
appellate waiver, like the language of a contract, matters 
greatly to our analysis[.]  [S]uch waivers must be strictly 
construed.”  Corso, 549 F.3d at 927 (citation, alteration, and 
internal quotation marks omitted); cf. United States v. 
Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In view of the 
government‟s tremendous bargaining power courts will 
strictly construe the text [of a plea agreement] against the 
government when it has drafted the agreement.” (alterations 
omitted)).  “But we are also mindful that under contract 
principles, a plea agreement necessarily works both ways.  
Not only must the government comply with its terms and 
conditions, but so must the defendant.”  Corso, 549 U.S. at 
927 (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, a defendant cannot “get the benefits 
of his plea bargain, while evading the costs because contract 
law would not support such a result.”  Id. (alteration and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The second step in reviewing an appellate waiver is to 
determine whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary. 
“[T]he role of the sentencing judge is critical” in that regard, 
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001), 
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because rule 11(b)(1)(N) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides that 
 
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, … the court must address the 
defendant personally in open court.  During this 
address, the court must inform the defendant of, 
and determine that the defendant understands 
the following: … the terms of any plea-
agreement provision waiving the right to appeal 
or to collaterally attack the sentence. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N).  We have held that “a statement 
made by the sentencing court during the [plea] colloquy can 
create ambiguity where none exists in the plain text of the 
plea agreement,” Saferstein, 673 F.3d at 243, and such 
ambiguity may result in a narrow construction of an appellate 
waiver, “to protect the defendant as the weaker bargaining 
party,”  id. 
 
The third and last step is to determine whether 
enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.  
When a waiver encompasses the issue on appeal and was 
entered knowingly and voluntarily, it must be enforced except 
in the “unusual circumstance” of “an error amounting to a 
miscarriage of justice.”  Khattak, 273 F.3d  562.  Certain 
factors weigh in the determination of whether a given error 
meets that standard: 
 
[T]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its 
character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, 
a sentencing guideline, or a statutory 
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maximum), the impact of the error on the 
defendant, the impact of correcting the error on 
the government, and the extent to which the 
defendant acquiesced in the result. 
Id. at 563 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Courts apply 
the “miscarriage of justice” exception “sparingly and without 
undue generosity,” United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 
458 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), but 
with the aim of avoiding “manifest injustice,” United States v. 
Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2007).
6
 
                                              
6
 It is not enough that an issue be meritorious: 
[B]y waiving the right to appeal, a defendant 
necessarily waives the opportunity to challenge 
the sentence imposed, regardless of the merits. 
…  A waiver of the right to appeal includes a 
waiver of the right to appeal difficult or 
debatable legal issues – indeed, it includes a 
waiver of the right to appeal blatant error.  
Waiver would be nearly meaningless if it 
included only those appeals that border on the 
frivolous. …  While it may appear unjust to 
allow criminal defendants to bargain away 
meritorious appeals, such is the necessary 
consequence of a system in which the right to 
appeal may be freely traded. 
Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561-62 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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1. Scope of the Appellate Waiver 
 
This case presents a procedural anomaly.  Ordinarily, 
plea agreements are entered before any trial in a case, but 
Castro entered his plea agreement in anticipation of a second 
trial, after he had been tried once and convicted on one of ten 
counts.  Our first task in determining whether Castro‟s 
appellate waiver should be enforced to prevent him from 
challenging his conviction for the crime charged in Count 
Three is to determine whether the waiver even encompasses 
that conviction. 
 
Castro asserts that the language of the appellate waiver 
does not clearly apply to his conviction at trial.  Because plea 
agreements are to be “strictly construed” against the 
government, Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562, he says that his 
appellate waiver should not apply to his conviction on Count 
Three.  He cannot, however, wish away the words of the 
waiver.  The plea agreement provides that Castro “voluntarily 
and expressly waives all rights to appeal or collaterally attack 
[his] conviction, sentence, or any other matter relating to this 
prosecution.”  (App. at 127.)  The breadth of the phrase “any 
other matter relating to this prosecution” surely encompasses 
Castro‟s earlier conviction on Count Three, and Castro‟s 
attempt to argue otherwise is unavailing. 
 
 2. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver 
 
But understanding the linguistic scope of the waiver is 
only the first step in determining whether the waiver applies.  
Castro claims that, during the Rule 11 colloquy, the District 
Court did not mention his earlier conviction, and that he was 
therefore under the impression that the waiver did not apply 
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to that conviction.  Instead, says Castro, the Court 
consistently emphasized that he was giving up his right to a 
second trial and the right to appeal his sentence.  Thus, Castro 
argues, “it is at least reasonable to conclude that the plea 
agreement did not concern the count on which there had 
already been a full trial.”  (Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 5.) 
 
Although he does not say so explicitly, Castro appears 
to be seeking shelter in our precedent that a judge‟s 
affirmative statements during a plea colloquy can sometimes 
overcome the otherwise plain terms of a plea agreement.
7
  
Such judge-created “ambiguity” must be construed “against 
the government,” Saferstein, 673 F.3d at 243, because, “[i]f it 
is reasonable to rely upon the court‟s words for clarification, 
then we cannot expect a defendant to distinguish and 
disregard those statements of the court that deviate from the 
language of a particular provision in a lengthy plea 
agreement,” United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160, 1168 
(10th Cir. 2007). 
 
Castro‟s argument is an elaboration on that precedent.  
He argues in essence that, by talking at length about the rights 
he would give up by foregoing a second trial, the District 
Court left him thinking that the waiver applied only 
prospectively and not as to the already fixed history of the 
case.  He suggests, in other words, that it is not only a district 
court‟s affirmative statements that can change the scope of a 
                                              
7
 As noted, we have held that, even when the written 
terms of an appellate waiver are clear, “a statement made by 
the sentencing court during the colloquy can create ambiguity 
where none exists in the plain text of the plea agreement.”  
Saferstein, 673 F.3d at 243. 
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plea agreement; a district court‟s emphases and omissions 
during a plea colloquy may also alter the defendant‟s 
understanding of the plain terms of the plea agreement.  We 
have never so held and we will not do so now. 
 
Indeed, even if we were to accept Castro‟s assertion 
that the District Court injected some confusion into the scope 
of the appellate waiver through emphasis and omission during 
the plea colloquy, we cannot accept that the colloquy 
overcame the import that the plea agreement‟s terms must 
have had for Castro, a man with years of law enforcement 
experience and two post-graduate degrees.  A deficient plea 
colloquy will not overcome the plain terms of an appellate 
waiver when the defendant is highly educated and should 
accordingly be held to his informed understanding of the text 
of the waiver.  See Goodson, 544 F.3d at 540-41 (defendant 
who was “college educated” and who had “successfully 
perpetrated wire fraud and the uttering of counterfeit checks” 
was held to his informed understanding of the plain terms of 
the plea agreement).  Castro affirmed under oath that he 
understood the plea agreement, and nothing in the record 
undermines that affirmation.  Given the plain terms of the 
plea agreement in this case, and given Castro‟s education and 
professional background, we conclude that he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to appeal his “conviction … or 
any other matter relating to this prosecution.”  (App. at 127.)   
 
 3. Miscarriage of Justice 
 
Castro‟s knowing and voluntary waiver forecloses his 
appeal of the conviction on Count Three, unless the waiver 
would result in a miscarriage of justice.  Castro says it would, 
because the record is devoid of evidence that he made a false 
 22 
 
statement when he stated that he received no money from 
Encarnacion in repayment of his $90,000 investment.  We are 
compelled to agree. 
 
We have not previously evaluated a challenge to an 
appellate waiver that is grounded on a claim of insufficiency 
of evidence amounting to a miscarriage of justice.  We have, 
however, evaluated claims of insufficiency of evidence in the 
plain error context and have explained that plain error 
warranting reversal exists when the insufficiency “resulted in 
a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Barel, 
939 F.2d 26, 37 (3d Cir. 1991).  To determine if that exacting 
standard is met, “we review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Government and will sustain the verdict 
unless a rational juror could not have found that the 
Government proved” one or more elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  United States v. Williams, 299 
F.3d 250, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2002).  The prosecution‟s failure to 
prove an essential element of the charged offense does 
constitute plain error, United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 
260-61 (3d Cir. 2001), and so can be understood as a 
miscarriage of justice, see United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 
478, 480 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]ffirming a conviction where the 
government has failed to prove each essential element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt affect[s] substantial rights, 
and seriously impugns the fairness, integrity and public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 
It bears emphasis, however, that a “manifest 
miscarriage of justice” warranting reversal on plain error 
review occurs only where the record is “devoid of evidence 
pointing to guilt” – a “stricter than usual standard.”  United 
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States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Vasquez, 
560 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because [defendant] 
failed to move for a judgment of acquittal at either the close 
of the government‟s case or the close of his case, we will 
reverse his conviction only if the record is devoid of evidence 
pointing to guilt, such that a manifest miscarriage of justice 
occurred.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States 
v. Irby, 558 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[R]eversal is 
warranted only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to 
guilt, or if the evidence on a key element was so tenuous that 
a conviction would be shocking.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 956 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (“[A] miscarriage [of justice] would exist only if 
the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, or because 
the evidence on a key element of the offense was so tenuous 
that a conviction would be shocking.” (alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
 
These insights from the plain error context are 
applicable to the “miscarriage of justice” argument before us 
now.  Cf. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (holding that for an error to 
result in a miscarriage of justice that overcomes an appellate 
waiver “„the error [must] seriously affect[] the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings‟” 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) 
(alterations in original)).  Castro is therefore required to show 
that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, the record is entirely devoid of evidence that he 
committed each element of a § 1001 offense – specifically, 
that he made a false statement to government officials when 
he insisted that he had not received money from Encarnacion 
in repayment of his $90,000 loan – so that allowing his 
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conviction to stand would “seriously impugn[] the fairness, 
integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
Jones, 471 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Section 1001 calls for punishment of anyone who 
“knowingly and willfully … makes any materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” in any 
matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government.  18 
U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 
 
To establish a violation of § 1001, the 
government [is] required to prove each of the 
following five elements: (1) that [the accused] 
made a statement or representation; (2) that the 
statement or representation was false; (3) that 
the false statement was made knowingly and 
willfully; (4) that the statement or 
representation was material; and (5) that the 
statement or representation was made in a 
matter within the jurisdiction of the federal 
government. 
United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 213 (3d Cir. 2012).  It 
is uncontroverted that all three payments that Castro received, 
ostensibly in repayment of Encarnacion‟s “debt,” were in fact 
not from Encarnacion but rather from the FBI through Moshe.  
None of the money in question actually came from 
Encarnacion, either directly or indirectly, nor had Castro 
collected any other money from Encarnacion in repayment 
for the supposed debt.  Castro‟s statement that he had not 
received money from Encarnacion, though intended to be a 
lie, was therefore entirely true, and the government cannot 
prove the second element of the offense. 
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That fact is crucial because, to properly convict Castro 
of violating § 1001, the government must be able to show that 
he made a statement to government agents that was untrue, 
and the government cannot satisfy that burden by showing 
that the defendant intended to deceive, if in fact he told the 
literal truth.  In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 
(1973), the Supreme Court held that a conviction under the 
federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, cannot rest on 
testimony that is unresponsive to the interrogation, even if 
intentionally deceptive, so long as the answer in question is 
literally true and the questioner is free to ask further 
clarifying questions.  We applied Bronston in United States v. 
Serafini, 167 F.3d 812, 822-24 (3d Cir. 1999), affirming the 
dismissal of a charge under the “false material declarations” 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, as applied to grand jury 
questioning.  In Serafini, we also stated that § 1001 is “[a] 
close kin” to §§ 1621 and 1623.  167 F.3d at 813 n.2.  Thus, 
the same interpretive principles apply to § 1001 prosecutions 
as were applied in Bronston and Serafini.  See also United 
States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The defense 
of literal truth applies to section 1001 prosecutions … .”).  
Accordingly, when a statement is literally true, it is, by 
definition, not false and cannot be treated as such under a 
perjury-type statute, no matter what the defendant‟s 
subjective state of mind might have been.  Cf. Williams v. 
United States, 458 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1982) (a bad check, 
even when knowingly used to defraud, cannot be a “false 
statement” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, because 
as a matter of negotiable instruments law a check makes no 
assertion about the truth of any matter stated thereon). 
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Viewing the record as required by Bronston, it is 
devoid of evidence that Castro made a false statement when 
he told government agents that he had not received money 
from Encarnacion.  On the contrary, that statement was 
completely, if unintentionally, accurate.  Thus, allowing his 
conviction on Count Three to stand would be to allow a 
conviction when there has been a complete failure of proof on 
an essential element of the charged crime, and that would 
seriously impugn the fairness, integrity, and public reputation 
of our courts.  In short, such a conviction constitutes a 
miscarriage of justice.   
 
The government nevertheless argues that, given 
Castro‟s belief that he was lying to FBI agents, there is 
nothing unfair in his conviction.  (See Appellee‟s Br. at 37 
(“Castro does not contend that he was unjustly charged with 
or convicted of this offense, but argues only that the evidence 
was legally insufficient to support his conviction.”).)  In the 
broadest sense, it is surely so that Castro was morally wrong 
even if not legally guilty, but our legal system does not 
convict people of being bad.  If they are to be convicted, it is 
for specific crimes, and the government here undertook the 
burden of proving that Castro had committed each element of 
the specific crime set forth in § 1001.  It failed to do that. 
 
The government tries to work its way around this 
failure-of-proof problem by arguing for a “sting operation 
exception” in § 1001 prosecutions.  As the government sees 
it, whether Castro‟s statements were literally true is 
irrelevant, as long as he subjectively believed he was lying to 
the FBI when he made them.  A contrary position, the 
government argues, “would pervert the very purpose of the 
literal truth defense, which is to protect people from 
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prosecution for literally true responses to the precise question 
asked, and surely was not intended to protect those who 
knowingly and willfully lie about their actions solely because 
they unknowingly acted in collusion with a government agent 
instead of a true criminal cohort.”  (Appellee‟s Br. at 47.) 
 
The ready and dispositive response to that argument is 
that, even if a “sting exception” to the strictures of § 1001 is a 
good idea, it is simply not in the statute.  Congress knows 
how to pass laws that penalize statements made to law 
enforcement officers by a defendant who incorrectly believes 
the statements to be false.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) 
(“knowing” laundering of funds “which in fact involves the 
proceeds” of a crime), with id. § 1956(a)(3) (intentional 
laundering of funds “represented to be” proceeds of a crime).  
But it did not do so when it enacted § 1001, and we are not 
free to amend the law.  Under analogous circumstances, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed as plain error a conviction for “knowing possession” 
of stolen government property because the property was not 
actually “stolen” but was rather sold to the defendant by 
agents in a sting operation.  United States v. Golomb, 811 
F.2d 787, 792-93 (2d Cir. 1987).  “Knowledge and belief are 
very different mental states,” the court held, and although the 
defendant “may very well have believed the checks were 
stolen, … [the statute] cannot be interpreted to support a 
conviction when the property at issue was not stolen.”  Id. at 
792. 
 
The government nevertheless insists that a jury could 
conclude, based on the evidence, “that the money Castro 
received came „from‟ Encarnacion.”  (Appellee‟s Br. at 41.)  
According to the government, “[t]he FBI paid $21,000 in real 
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cash to Castro, through its agent, Moshe, and represented 
through Moshe that the payments were on behalf of 
Encarnacion.  A jury could thus readily determine that Castro 
received money „from‟ Encarnacion, and lied about it to the 
agents when asked.”  (Id. at 41.)  It is not clear how the 
quotation marks around the word “from” in that sentence help 
the argument.  The money was not “from” Encarnacion in any 
sense, and we are frankly at a loss to understand the 
government‟s assertion that Castro “not only believed that his 
answer was false … , but it was in fact false.”  (Appellee‟s 
Br. at 50.)  There is, quite literally, no evidence whatsoever 
that even a penny of the money that Moshe handed over to 
Castro came from Encarnacion.  To say, as the government 
does, that “[t]he FBI actually gave Castro $21,000 on 
Encarnacion‟s behalf” (Appellee‟s Br. at 52), is an invention, 
since nothing shows that Encarnacion owed Castro anything, 
much less that he authorized the government to pay Castro on 
his behalf.  Castro is therefore not guilty on Count Three, 
because the statement set forth in that count simply was not 
false.
8
 
                                              
8
 The District Court‟s jury instructions were correct in 
highlighting that “[a] false … statement … is an assertion 
which is untrue when made.”  (D.I. 92:150-51 (Tr. 4/18/11) 
(emphasis added).)  The subjective belief of the person 
making the statement is an entirely separate element of the 
offense.  The false statement must be “known by the person 
making it or using it to be untrue.”  (Id.)  In this regard, we 
note our disagreement with the government‟s assertion that 
“the fact that Castro was not charged with attempting to make 
a false statement is of no consequence.”  (Appellee‟s Br. at 
52.)  What is charged is of enormous consequence, and had 
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The complete failure of proof on the “actual falsity” 
element of the offense charged in Count Three requires 
reversal of Castro‟s conviction on that count, as the 
conviction is infected with plain error and constitutes a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
B. The District Court’s Denial of the 
Government’s Motion for an Additional One 
Point Reduction in Castro’s Offense Level for 
Acceptance of Responsibility 
Castro also contends that his 60-month sentence under 
Count Nine is procedurally unreasonable because the District 
Court erred in refusing to reduce his offense level under 
§ 3E1.1(b).  In his view, the additional adjustment is 
mandatory if the government moves for it and the other 
requirements of the provision are met.  Whether that is so is a 
question we have not addressed but which has divided other 
circuits.  Compare United States v. Williamson, 598 F.3d 227 
(5th Cir. 2010) (district court has authority to determine 
whether conditions for one level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility under § 3E1.1 have been satisfied), with United 
States v. Mount, 675 F.3d 1052, 1055-57 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(application of additional one level decrease in defendant‟s 
offense level under § 3E1.1 is mandatory).  We decline to 
address that question, however, because it is precluded by 
Castro‟s appellate waiver and no miscarriage of justice would 
result from enforcing the waiver on this point. 
 
                                                                                                     
there been an effort to charge and prove an attempt, there 
would be another and very different set of legal issues in play. 
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Castro says that his argument is not precluded by the 
appellate waiver because it implicates one of the express 
exceptions contained in the waiver – namely, the exception 
for “constitutional claims that the relevant case law holds 
cannot be waived.”9  (App. at 127.)  But Castro provides no 
relevant authority to demonstrate that the “constitutional 
claims” exception applies in this context.  It appears instead 
that a district court‟s arguably erroneous calculation of a 
guidelines range “is precisely the kind of „garden variety‟ 
claim of error contemplated by [an] appellate waiver.”  
Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2010).  It 
is not a “miscarriage of justice.”  See Corso, 549 F.3d at 931-
32 (“[A]llow[ing] alleged errors in computing a defendant‟s 
sentence to render a waiver unlawful would nullify the waiver 
based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive.” 
(second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 283-84 (3d 
                                              
9
 Castro does not claim, as he did when arguing that 
his conviction under Count Three was not covered by the 
appellate waiver provision, that the District Court‟s plea 
colloquy injected uncertainty into the meaning of the 
otherwise plain terms of the appellate waiver.  Nor could he.  
A review of the plea colloquy establishes that the District 
Court properly questioned Castro and took affirmative steps 
to ensure that his plea was knowing and voluntary.  
Specifically, Castro testified that he had read the terms of the 
plea agreement, that he had discussed them with his attorney, 
that he agreed to all of the terms, and that he understood that 
the agreement limited his right to appeal.  Castro‟s plea was 
thus knowing and voluntary with respect to the District 
Court‟s denial of the government‟s motion for a one-level 
reduction in Castro‟s offense level pursuant to § 3E1.1(b). 
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Cir. 2009) (holding enforcement of an appellate waiver would 
not constitute a miscarriage of justice despite defendant‟s 
claim that the government abused its discretion by not 
requesting an additional reduction in the district court‟s 
sentencing calculation); United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 
231, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (defendant‟s challenges to district 
court‟s sentencing calculation were “insubstantial and clearly 
encompassed by the broad waiver,” and “[did] not implicate 
fundamental rights or constitutional principles”).   
 
Castro has failed to demonstrate that his appellate 
waiver does not encompass this claim or that he did not waive 
it knowingly and voluntarily, and he has not established that 
enforcement of the appellate waiver would result in a 
miscarriage of justice.  We thus decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over his appeal with respect to the District 
Court‟s rejection of the government‟s motion for a downward 
departure under § 3E1.1(b). 
 
C.  The Procedural and Substantive 
Reasonableness of Castro’s 60-Month Sentence 
Under Count Nine 
Finally, Castro argues that, when it imposed a sentence 
that varied upwards by nearly 50 percent above the highest 
sentence recommended by the guidelines, the District Court 
produced a sentence that was procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable.  According to Castro, the Court did not 
adequately explain why such a harsh sentence was necessary 
to achieve the legitimate aims of sentencing, considering all 
the aggravating and mitigating factors of the case, and the 
Court did not adequately account for Castro‟s lengthy record 
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of good works.
10
  In response, the government supports the 
sentence as well justified in light of numerous statements by 
the District Court explaining the reasons for the sentence 
given.  We agree that the sentence was well explained, but, 
given the flawed inclusion of Count Three in the sentencing 
calculus, the overall sentence must be reassessed. 
 
Despite our well-known procedure for reviewing 
criminal sentences,
11
 the District Court‟s upward variance is 
                                              
10
 Castro‟s arguments in this regard are not foreclosed 
by his appellate waiver because the waiver contains an 
exception for “claims that … the sentencing judge, exercising 
the Court‟s discretion pursuant to United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005), imposed an unreasonable sentence 
above the final Sentencing Guideline range.”  (App. at 128.) 
11
 Our review of a criminal sentence “proceeds in two 
stages.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).  First, we review the sentence for procedural 
error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, 
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 
explain the chosen sentence – including an explanation for 
any deviation from the Guidelines range.”  Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  If there was procedural error, 
“our preferred course is to remand the case for re-sentencing, 
without going any further.”  United States v. Merced, 603 
F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010).  Second, if there was no 
procedural error, “we review for substantive reasonableness, 
and „we will affirm [the sentence] unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on 
that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
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unreviewable at this juncture, because, in calculating Castro‟s 
“combined offense level” for “multiple counts” using the 
method supplied by § 3D1.4 of the sentencing guidelines, the 
Court arrived at an offense level that was one level higher (20 
instead of 19) than would have resulted if the conviction on 
Count Three had not been included.  That in turn led to a 
guidelines range of 33 to 41 months instead of 30 to 37 
months.  “[G]iven the importance of a correct Guidelines 
calculation both to the sentencing process that district courts 
are required to conduct and to our ability to carry out 
reasonableness review, the use of an erroneous Guidelines 
range will typically require reversal under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(f).”  United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Our reversal of Castro‟s conviction under Count 
Three accordingly necessitates a remand for resentencing 
solely for Castro‟s guilty plea on Count Nine.  See id. at 211, 
214 (“[A] correctly calculated Guidelines range will often be 
a necessary precondition of our reasonableness review.  
Where a district court begins with an erroneous range, it will 
be difficult for us to determine that it fulfilled its duty to 
consider the Guidelines and reason through to the ultimate 
sentence,” because “the correct computation of the Guidelines 
range and any departures therefrom serves to clarify the basis 
for the sentence imposed and thus facilitates reasonableness 
review.”). 
 
We note with appreciation the District Court‟s 
thorough and thoughtful accounting of the aggravating and 
                                                                                                     
provided.‟”  United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 443 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568).  At both stages 
we review for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Wise, 515 
F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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mitigating circumstances in this case and its explanation for 
why it concluded that an upward variance was necessary to 
accomplish the legitimate aims of sentencing.
12
  Despite that 
exemplary handling of the always difficult work of crafting 
and explaining an appropriate sentence, we must nevertheless 
remand for resentencing because we cannot conclude with 
confidence that, had the District Court operated from the 
                                              
12
 For example, the Court specifically acknowledged 
much of Castro‟s good character, including that, “[w]ith 
perhaps one or two exceptions, I have never received as many 
letters attesting to a defendant‟s good character and urging 
leniency as I have in this case,” which showed that, “[c]learly, 
he has the support and respect of many people in this 
community and elsewhere.”  (App. at 225.)  The Court also 
recognized that Castro “has shown contrition for what he has 
done” and “is sincere in saying that he is sorry.”  (App. at 
228.)  Despite Castro‟s “many good works, particularly with 
children” (App. at 225), the Court expressed deep concern 
over Castro‟s willingness to use “force and violence.”  (App. 
at 227; see also id. (“I can‟t emphasize this enough, if force 
and violence had been used, someone could have been 
killed.”).)  But “most troubling” to the Court was that Castro 
was a police officer, and police officers “are held to a much 
higher standard.”  (App. at 230.)  The Court felt “a 
compelling need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct, particularly to deter others in law enforcement who 
may contemplate illegal conduct.”  (App. at 229.)  After 
considering the mitigating and aggravating evidence, the 
Court found that the nature of Castro‟s conduct and the 
tremendous damage caused by that conduct outweighed the 
positive aspects of Castro‟s history and character, and called 
for a higher sentence. 
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correct guidelines range (30 to 37 months instead of 33 to 41 
months), it would still have given a 60-month sentence.  See 
Langford, 516 F.3d at 215 (“[T]he improper calculation of the 
Guidelines range can rarely be shown not to affect the 
sentence imposed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
On remand, the District Court is “free to make its own 
reasonable application of the § 3553(a) factors” and 
ultimately may choose “to reject (after due consideration) the 
advice of the Guidelines” and impose the same sentence.  
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 113 (2007) (Scalia, 
J., concurring).  But it must consider the correct guidelines 
range. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse Castro‟s 
conviction and 18-month sentence after trial on Count Three 
and remand to the District Court for entry of a judgment of 
acquittal on that count.  We will also vacate Castro‟s 60-
month sentence under Count Nine and remand to the District 
Court for resentencing on that count, using the correct 
guidelines range. 
